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Abstract
CardSpace (formerly known as InfoCard) is a digital identity man-
agement system that has recently been adopted by Microsoft. In this
paper we identify two security shortcomings in CardSpace that could
lead to a serious privacy violation. The first is its reliance on user
judgements of the trustworthiness of service providers, and the second
is its reliance on a single layer of authentication. We also propose a
modification designed to address both flaws. The proposed approach
is compatible with the currently deployed CardSpace identity meta-
system, and should enhance the privacy of the system whilst involving
only minor changes to the current CardSpace framework. We also
provide a security and performance analysis of the proposal.
1 Introduction
The growing use of Internet web applications gives rise to the problem of
managing the necessary digital identities and preserving their privacy. In an
open large-scale domain such as the Internet, preserving user privacy is not
a straightforward task. Identity theft, which occurs when an impostor uses a
legitimate user’s identifying information without his/her consent, is becom-
ing one of the biggest security concerns both for users and for organisations
offering services on the Internet.
Many solutions to the threat of identity theft, and to tackle identity-
oriented attacks such as phishing and pharming, have been proposed in the
last few years. One class of solutions is based on the notions of Identity
Federation, where different identities for the same user in a particular trust
domain are ‘federated’, and Single Sign-On, where a user only needs to
authenticate once in a single working session.
In 1999, Microsoft adopted .NET Passport, an identity federation and
ticket-based single sign-on system. Although .NET Passport was supported
by a number of well-known service providers, such as eBay and Visa, it was
not widely used for single sign-on. The single sign-on features have since
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been dropped, and Passport now functions simply as a means of logging into
Microsoft sites. In 2005, Microsoft published two papers that discuss the
“failure” of .NET Passport [5, 12].
More recently, Microsoft proposed a new identity management frame-
work called CardSpace. CardSpace has some similarities to other identity
federation systems; however it is not a single sign-on system. CardSpace is
designed to reduce the reliance on passwords for Internet user authentication
by service providers, and to improve the privacy of personal information.
In this paper we identify significant security and privacy issues in the
CardSpace scheme. We focus on two particular security problems, namely
its reliance on user judgements of the trustworthiness of service providers,
and its dependency on a single layer of user authentication to the Identity
Provider. In this paper we propose a solution for these two problems, using
the concept of Secured from Identity Theft (SIT) attributes [3] and zero-
knowledge cryptographic techniques.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we pro-
vide a brief overview of the CardSpace framework. In section 3 we describe
two security flaws in CardSpace. In section 4 we propose a solution for the
security problems discussed in section 3. In section 5 a security and per-
formance analysis of the proposed solution is given, and in section 6 other
possible solutions are briefly discussed. Section 7 concludes the paper.
A preliminary version of the solution described in section 4 was given in
[1], although the analysis in section 5 extends considerably that given there.
Moreover, the alternative solutions given in section 6 have not previously
been published.
2 Microsoft CardSpace
In this section we provide a brief overview of CardSpace. We then describe
the CardSpace framework and message flow.
2.1 An Overview
CardSpace is the name for a Microsoft WinFX set of software components
that form an identity management system or an identity metasystem, since
it is a system of systems. This identity metasystem is designed to comply
with the Laws of Identity [5], promulgated by Microsoft.
Digital identities in CardSpace are represented as claims made by one
digital subject (e.g. an Internet user) about itself or another digital subject.
A claim is an assertion that certain identifying information (e.g. given name,
SSN, credit card number, etc.) belongs to a given digital subject [6, 13].
Under this definition, user identifiers (e.g. a username) and user attributes
(e.g. user gender) are both treated as claims within the identity metasystem.
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CardSpace can be integrated with Microsoft Windows XP and Internet
Explorer version 7 (a toolkit is freely available from Microsoft), and has been
distributed with Windows Vista. Since CardSpace is an ‘open’ XML-based
framework, CardSpace plug-ins for browsers other than Microsoft Internet
Explorer can be developed, such as the Firefox Plug-in1.
2.2 The CardSpace Framework
The CardSpace framework is based on the identification process we ex-
perience in the real world using physical identification cards. Within the
CardSpace framework, an identity provider issues a user with a virtual card
called InfoCard, which is an XML file containing (relatively) non-sensitive
meta-information about the user. Subsequently, a user can use one of its In-
foCards to help identify itself to any service provider who trusts the identity
provider that issued the selected InfoCard. InfoCards can also be self-issued
by the users themselves.
Figure 1: CardSpace Framework.
Figure 1 provides a simplified sketch of the CardSpace framework. In the
figure it is assumed that the user has already been issued an InfoCard by an
identity provider (IdP). In step 1, the CardSpace-enabled user agent or the
Service Requestor (henceforth abbreviated to CEUA), which is essentially a
CardSpace-enabled web browser, requests a service from the relying party
(RP), i.e. the service provider. In step 2, the RP identifies itself using
a public key certificate (e.g. a certificate used for SSL/TLS), and declares
itself as a CardSpace-enabled RP using XHTML code or HTML object tags.
After recognising that the RP is CardSpace-enabled, the CEUA retrieves the
RP security policy in step 3. This policy contains a list of the claim types
that must be asserted about the Internet user (henceforth abbreviated to
user) in order for this user to be granted the service, the IdPs that are
1http://xmldap.blogspot.com/2006/05/firefox-identity-selector.html
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trusted to make such assertions, and the types of security token that are
acceptable to the RP. The security policy also specifies requirements that
must be met by the retrieved security token (e.g. the type of proof key, or
the maximum token age). It is important to emphasise here that CardSpace
identity metasystem itself does not restrict the type of security tokens, i.e.
all types of token can be used within the framework.
In step 4 the CEUA matches the RP’s security policy with the InfoCards
possessed by the user in order to find one that satisfies the RP’s policy. If
one or more suitable InfoCards are found, the user is prompted to select an
InfoCard from amongst them. After the user has selected an InfoCard, the
CEUA initiates a connection with the IdP that issued that InfoCard. The
user performs an authentication process with the IdP in step 5.
If the authentication process succeeds, step 6 takes place, in which the
CEUA requests the IdP to provide a security token that holds an assertion of
the truth of the claims listed within the selected InfoCard; the message that
holds this request is called a request security token message. The IdP will
then check whether its security policy permits it to generate the requested
security token. If so, the IdP will reply by sending a security token within a
message called a request security token response message. Finally, the CEUA
forwards the security token to the RP in step 7, and, if the RP verifies it
successfully, the service will be granted in step 8.
It is worth mentioning here that, after step 6, the contents of the security
token can optionally be displayed to the user before proceeding to step 7.
Moreover, the RP will get an assertion from the IdP that the security token
received was issued to a particular user. This assertion is based on the use
of a secret ‘proof-key’, where a user asserts ownership of a security token by
demonstrating knowledge of the proof-key included in the token [14]. This
assertion helps to prevent token replay attacks, i.e. where an attacker ‘steals’
a token for another user. The RP can select one of two types of proof-key:
1. Symmetric (default): In this case, the CEUA must reveal the identity
of the RP to the IdP. The IdP then generates a secret key, encrypts it
with the RP’s public key, and inserts it inside the security token. This
secret key is sent to the CEUA in step 6 (over an SSL/TLS channel).
The CEUA can now use this secret key to prove rightful possession of
the security token.
2. Asymmetric (recommended by Microsoft): In this case, the CEUA
generates an ephemeral RSA key pair, and sends the public key to the
IdP. The IdP then inserts this public key inside the security token.
The CEUA can now use the corresponding private key to prove rightful
possession of the security token.
The CardSpace identity metasystem makes use of XML-based protocols,
including the Web Services (WS-*) protocols and SOAP. The message flows
of the CardSpace framework are as follows:
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1. CEUA → RP : HTTP GET Login HTML Page Request
2. RP → CEUA : HTML Login Page + InfoCard Tags (XHTML or HTML
object tags)
3. CEUA ↔ RP : CEUA retrieves security policy via WS-SecurityPolicy
4. CEUA ↔ User : User picks an InfoCard
5. CEUA ↔ IdP : User Authentication
6. CEUA↔ IdP : CEUA retrieves security token viaWS-MetadataExchange
and WS-Trust
7. CEUA → RP : CEUA presents the security token via WS-Trust
8. RP → CEUA : Welcome, you are now logged in!
WS-MetadataExchange [7], WS-Trust [9] and WS-SecurityPolicy [10]
messages are transported over SOAP. The messages in steps 3, 5, 6 and 7
must be carried over an SSL/TLS channel to preserve their confidentiality. It
appears reasonable to assume that the most commonly used security token
type will be a SAML assertion, carried over SOAP. The integrity of the
security token is preserved using an XML-Signature as part of the WS-
Security [15] protocol.
3 Security Limitations of CardSpace
We next discuss certain security limitations of the CardSpace framework.
One such limitation is its reliance on DNS names to identify the IdPs and
the RPs. If the DNS server is controlled by an attacker, it can direct the
identity metasystem parties to false websites. This problem is common to
many current Internet identity management solutions, and is very difficult
to address. Probably the only long term solution to this problem is to hope
that the use of DNSSEC [2], or some other secure address resolution solution,
will become widespread.
Another limitation is that, in the default scenario for the CardSpace
framework, the IdP is aware of the identities of the RPs to which the user
attempts to log in. Accordingly, the IdP can learn about the behaviour of
users on the web. Although there is an alternative scenario, we believe that
this is a potentially serious privacy violation. One solution to this issue is to
hope that, at some future time, use of the CardSpace option in which RPs
remain anonymous becomes the norm.
In the remainder of this section we focus on two particular security lim-
itations of the CardSpace framework which we believe are particularly sig-
nificant, namely its reliance on the user’s judgement of the trustworthiness
of the RP and on a single layer of authentication. These two issues are
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addressed here partly because of their potential seriousness, and partly be-
cause, unlike other issues, no solution appears to be in place, even for the
long term.
3.1 Judgements of RP Trustworthiness
The user judgement regarding the honesty of the RP is a security-critical
task. As described in section 2.2, the RP will obtain personal information
belonging to the user in the form of ‘asserted claims’ within a security token,
as sent in step 7 of the message flow. Thus, if the RP is not trustworthy, it
could gather information about users and potentially use this information in
unauthorised ways. Accordingly, any misjudgement of the trustworthiness
of an RP could result in a serious privacy violation. Hence, the task of
judging the honesty of the RP is a very important one.
In the CardSpace framework, as described in section 2.2, when the user
is prompted for its consent to be authenticated to an RP using a particular
InfoCard, the user makes a judgement regarding the trustworthiness of the
RP based on one of:
1. a high-assurance public key certificate belonging to the RP,
2. an ‘ordinary’ public key certificate belonging to the RP (e.g. a certifi-
cate used for SSL/TLS), or
3. no certificate at all.
Obviously, in the third situation the user has no evidence of the honesty
of the RP [6].
Microsoft recommends the first option, i.e. the use of a high assurance
certificate [4, 14] (also referred to as a ‘higher-value’, ‘higher-assurance’ or
‘extended validation’ certificate). Such a certificate is an X.509 certificate
that is only issued after a rigorous and well-defined registration process,
unlike the CA-specific procedures used for issuing certificates commonly
employed as the basis for SSL/TLS security. A high assurance certificate
might include a digitally signed bitmap of the RP’s company logo, in order to
make it easier for the user to identify the certificate holder2. Figure 2 shows
an example of a CardSpace message to the user describing a high assurance
certificate issued by ‘Verisign’ to a company called ‘Overdue Media’. The
‘check mark’ beside a certificate’s field is an indication that the certificate
issuer has assurance of the veracity of that field.
In general, it would appear that a typical user is not qualified to make
such a security critical decision. Most users do not pay much attention
2The inclusion of such a logo is discussed in a number of documents circulated by
Microsoft [6, 14], although the latest version of the draft standard for extended validation
certificates [4], as published by the CA/Browser Forum, does not mandate the inclusion
of a logo. Whether or not such a requirement will be included in the standard at a later
date remains unclear.
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Figure 2: An example of a higher-value certificate [6].
when they are asked to approve a digital certificate, either because they do
not understand the importance of the approval decision, or because they
know that they must approve the certificate in order to get access to a
particular website. RPs without any certificates at all can be used in the
CardSpace framework (given user consent), and this leads to a serious risk
of a privacy violation. If we consider the potentially massive number of
RPs, it is likely that (at least initially) many of them will not possess a
high assurance certificate. Even in the case where an RP does have a high
assurance certificate and the user is careful, the user may be deceived by
a company name or logo that is similar to that used by a legitimate RP
(although in principle this should be prevented by the registration process
for a high assurance certificate).
It is important to emphasise that this problem is less critical in some
other identity management frameworks, such as those of the Liberty Alliance
Project3 and OpenID4. In the Liberty Alliance framework, no personal
information is revealed to the service provider (or the RP); the RP gets
only an assertion from the IdP that a particular user has been authenticated
using a specific authentication method. The only framework-related problem
arising from trusting an imposter RP within the Liberty Alliance framework
would be revealing information about the existence of a relationship between
a user and a certain IdP [17]. That is, the problem arises in CardSpace
because CardSpace allows claims about users to be handled in a transparent
way. These claims could contain extremely sensitive user information, and
a user may not be aware what user information is being passed to the RP




3.2 Reliance on a Single Layer of Authentication
As discussed in section 2, the security of the CardSpace identity metasystem
relies on the authentication of the user by the IdP. In a case where a single
IdP and multiple RPs are involved in a single working session, which we
expect to be a typical scenario, the security of the identity metasystem
within that working session will rely on a single layer of authentication, i.e.
the authentication of the user to the IdP. This user authentication can be
achieved in a variety of ways (e.g. using an X.509 certificate, Kerberos v5
ticket, self-issued token or password); however, it seems likely that, in the
majority of cases, a simple username/password authentication technique will
be used.
If a working session is hijacked (e.g. by compromising a self-issued to-
ken), or the password is cracked (e.g. via guessing, brute-force, key logging,
or dictionary attacks), the security of the entire system will be compro-
mised. It is fair to mention here that most of the deployed Internet identity
management solutions, such as Liberty and OpenID, suffer from the same
vulnerability.
4 Improving the Security of CardSpace
In this section we describe a scheme designed to address both of the major
security limitations discussed in section 3, (i.e. reliance on a user judgement
of RP trustworthiness and a single layer of authentication). It is based on
the concept of Secured from Identity Theft (SIT) attributes [3], which is
based on Schnorr’s zero-knowledge protocol [8, 16]. We treat the claims
within the CardSpace framework as SIT attributes.
The goal is to prevent the need to reveal the actual values of the claims
to any party within the CardSpace framework. This means that no party
will have to trust any other party to the level that it has to reveal the actual
values of the claims to it.
The scheme operates as follows. Instead of including the actual value of
the claim in the security token in step 6 of the message flow illustrated in
section 2.2, the IdP will include data computed using the value of the claim.
It must not be feasible for the CEUA or the RP to deduce the value of
the claim using only this data. It merits mentioning here that the structure
and the content of the security token will remain the same (e.g. time-stamps,
pseudonyms, signature values, etc.), except the part that includes the actual
value of the claim. We now examine the operation of the scheme in greater
detail.
It is important to note that this scheme is not intended to replace the
use of extended validation certificates. Such certificates, particularly if they
include a readily recognisable item such as a corporate logo, are a potentially
valuable way of improving user understanding of authentication issues.
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4.1 Protocol Requirements
Prior to use of the protocol, the Identity Provider must select three domain
parameters, p, q and g, where p and q are large primes satisfying q|(p− 1),
and g is an element of multiplicative order q in Z∗p. These domain parameters
must be made known to the CEUA and RP in a reliable way, e.g. by inclusion
in a certificate signed by a trusted CA. The IdP, CEUA and RP are all
required to know the actual value of the claim prior to the protocol run,
or at least know that it lies within a small set of possible values (this can
be achieved by requiring the user and the RP to conduct a registration
procedure prior to use of the protocol, in which the user registers the claim
values that can later be asserted to this particular RP).
4.2 Protocol Steps
The following protocol (see [8, 16]) forms the basis of the proposed solution.
1. IdP → CEUA : s = g−c mod p [where c is the claim value, and s is
included in a security token].
2. CEUA → RP : s, d = gr mod p [where r is a random integer
(1 6 r 6 q − 1) chosen by the CEUA].
3. RP → CEUA : e [e is a random integer (1 6 e 6 2t) chosen by the
RP, and t is a security parameter].
4. CEUA → RP : y = r + ec mod q
5. RP: if d = gyse mod p, then user authentication is successful.
All the messages sent in the above protocol must be conveyed over a
channel that protects both confidentiality and integrity (e.g. an SSL/TLS
channel). The protocol can easily be integrated with the currently deployed
CardSpace identity metasystem; indeed, no changes to the metasystem are
required. However, some minor changes must be made to the framework
and the way that each party handles the security tokens. Steps 1, 2 and 5 of
the above protocol should be integrated with steps 6, 7 and 8, respectively,
of the message flow described in section 2.2. The value s should be digitally
signed by the IdP by including it within the security token (e.g. using an
XML-signature within a SAML assertion).
After the second step of the protocol above, the RP knows that the IdP
is asserting a claim, from the inclusion of s = g−c mod p in the token; if,
moreover, the RP knows in advance the expected value of c, then it can
use the received value s to verify whether the IdP is asserting this expected
value or not. Also, if the RP knows that c lies within a certain small set of
values, then the RP can determine which is being asserted by a simple trial
and error process; however, if the set of possible values for c is very large,
then the RP does not learn anything about the asserted claim. After the
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protocol has completed, and if user authentication is successful, then the RP
can grant the service to the user. Not only does successful completion of the
protocol mean that the IdP is asserting the claim regarding the user, but it
also proves that the user knows the claim value c, providing an additional
layer of user authentication. Of course, the strength of this additional layer
of authentication will depend on whether the claim is readily guessable by
a third party.
The protocol thus enables the IdP to assert a claim about the user, and
for the user to confirm knowledge of this claim, without revealing the claim
to the RP. This means that the user does not need to trust the RP not to
misuse a revealed claim. Also note that the scheme has the advantage that
it does not require any additional key management.
In the case of self-issued tokens, there is no IdP in the framework. The
user must include the value s = g−c mod p instead of the actual value of the
claim in the security token.
The above scheme is based on a specific cryptosystem, namely the Schnorr
protocol. It would be possible to replace this scheme with any other scheme
with similar properties. More specifically, we require a protocol which en-
ables both the CEUA and the RP to prove knowledge of the a claim c, so
that the RP knows that they both know the claim, but so that the data is
not revealed in this process. The particular advantage of the Schnorr scheme
in this context is that achieves all the objectives in an efficient way, and can
be seamlessly incorporated into the CardSpace message flows.
5 Analysis
We now provide a security and performance analysis of the scheme.
5.1 Security
We first consider the scheme’s security properties.
5.1.1 Addressing the CardSpace Security Limitations
In section 3 we discussed certain security limitations of the CardSpace frame-
work. In particular, we highlighted its reliance on the user’s judgement of
the trustworthiness of the RP, and on a single layer of authentication. We
believe that the scheme proposed in section 4 addresses both these security
limitations.
The scheme avoids the need to rely on the user’s judgement of the trust-
worthiness of the RP by avoiding the need for trust between the user and the
RP. In the revised protocol the user does not reveal personal information
to the RP. Instead, the user demonstrates knowledge of this information.
Of course, the user will still have to trust the RP at least once, in order to
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register her/his personal information with that RP (e.g. when he/she first
registers with that RP), and this trust is likely to be based on a public key
certificate (e.g. the RP’s SSL certificate). However, it appears reasonable
to assume that the user will be more careful during this one-off registration
procedure than in routine use of the RP service.
The modified protocol no longer relies on a single layer of authentica-
tion. If the working session is hijacked (e.g. by compromising a self-issued
token), or the user’s password is cracked, the security of the system will not
be totally breached, since the solution adds a new layer of authentication.
When trying to log-in to an RP, an attacker will not be able to demonstrate
knowledge of the user’s personal information, and hence the RP will not let
the attacker log in. Moreover, the attacker cannot learn the user’s personal
information, since the claim values will not be included in the security token.
5.1.2 Privacy
We believe that the scheme should increase the privacy level of CardSpace
users. As shown in section 4, claim values are not revealed at any stage.
This is a significant enhancement to the privacy of CardSpace.
Unlike in the currently deployed CardSpace identity metasystem, the
user does not have to reveal the identity of the RP to the IdP. This should
also enhance the privacy of the users.
The scheme implicitly assumes that the number of possible values for a
claim c is greater than 2128 (see also section 5.1.3 below). As a result, it
should be computationally infeasible for an adversary to deduce the value of
c from the value s (assuming that the Discrete Logarithm problem is difficult
[11]).
The proposed scheme satisfies the requirements of law 2 of Microsoft’s
own laws of identity to a greater degree than the currently deployed CardSpace
identity metasystem, where this law states that only the minimum amount
of identifying information must be revealed.
5.1.3 The Guessing Problem
Since the scheme is based on disguising user personal information, there is
always the risk of an attacker guessing this information and breaking the
second layer of authentication that the scheme provides. Some claims can
easily be guessed, especially for ‘user-oriented’ attacks where information
about the user is already known by the attacker. Examples of such claims
include first name, home country, age, and marital status. If an attacker
successfully broke the CardSpace first layer of authentication (which might,
for example, be password-based), then she/he could try to guess a particular
claim and verify whether or not her/his guess is correct before forwarding
the security token to the RP. This can be done using the publicly known
11
parameters p and g and the value s received in step 1 of the protocol run.
We propose two possible solutions for this problem. The first, which we
recommend, requires the RP to choose ‘hard to guess’ claims to be asserted
by the IdP, such as a combination of a series of attributes, such as mother’s
maiden name, social security number and credit card number. Since a suc-
cessful guessing attack, if combined with breaking the first level of authen-
tication, would allow an imposter user to log in to an RP, the RP could
protect itself by requesting claims that cannot easily be guessed. Indeed,
many Internet service providers already rely on ‘hard to guess’ personal
information to authenticate users when they forget their passwords.
Another approach would be for the IdP to mask the value c, e.g. by
using the value c+x instead of c, where x is a random value selected by the
IdP. The value of x can then be shared with the RP by encrypting it using
the RP public key and inserting it into the security token. However, this
solution requires the user to reveal the identity of the RP to the IdP, and this
removes one of the advantages of the scheme (as discussed in section 5.1.2).
Finally, there is a risk of a fake RP guessing the personal information of
the user and verifying the correctness of its guesses using the publicly known
parameters and the value s. The first solution described above addresses this
problem; the user/CEUA can refuse to request an assertion for claims that
can be easily guessed.
5.1.4 Access to Claims by the CEUA
The proposed solution requires the CEUA to be aware of the actual value of
the claim in order to generate a response message to the challenge message
it receives from the RP. In some cases it is not realistic to expect users to
memorise all of their registered claim values, so that they can pass them to
the CEUA when required. Certain claims can be hard to remember, such as
a health record number or a credit card number. Moreover, being required
to enter the actual values of the claims every time a user logs in to a website
might be extremely inconvenient. Hence, we consider other ways by which
the CEUA can retrieve the actual values of the claims.
We propose three approaches, although each has certain limitations:
1. Storing the claim values on a trusted server : users could retrieve their
registered claim values from a third party server (after being authen-
ticated by the server). However, this would add complexity to the
framework.
2. Storing the claim values on a hardware user token: Such an approach
is potentially more reliable and less complex than the first approach.
Storing the claims on a hardware token, such as USB memory stick
or smart card, would add an authentication factor to the scheme (i.e
the possession of the token). This solution is similar to the ID card
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identification process used in the real world, where a person needs to
present an identification card in order to be authenticated. However,
token provisioning and management adds significant user complexity.
3. Retrieving the claim values directly from the IdP by the CEUA: the
user could request the IdP to provide it with the claim values, after
the IdP has authenticated the user, and prior to requesting a security
token. Such a process would have to take place outside the current
CardSpace framework. This would mean adding one more message to
the framework and losing the additional layer of authentication.
5.2 Performance
The proposed scheme can readily be integrated with the currently deployed
CardSpace identity metasystem. Only two steps need to be added to the
framework described in section 2; these two steps involve exchanging the
zero-knowledge-proof messages, and should take place at the end of the
message flow. An additional step may be needed if the third proposed
solution to the problem of retrieving the claims values by the CEUA is
adopted (as described in section 5.1.4).
Incorporating the protocol into the CardSpace message flow requires
some minor changes to the contents of the security token. Other than these
changes, the metasystem remains precisely the same (including the security
token format, message flow, etc.). Table 1 shows the computational load
imposed by the scheme on each system party, where Ef denotes a modular
exponentiation with respect to a fixed base, M denotes a modular mul-
tiplication, and Ev denotes a modular exponentiation to a variable base.
Addition and comparison operations have been neglected in these assess-
ments of computational load, because their complexity is much less than
that of the exponentiation and multiplication operations.
Table 1: Computational load on system parties
Party Computational load
IdP 1Ef
CEUA 1Ef + 1M
RP 1Ef + 1Ev + 1M
From Table 1 we conclude that the scheme imposes a manageable com-
putational load on the involved parties, given that modular exponentiations
can be performed in milliseconds on modern processors.
The shared parameters p, q and g can be changed frequently if required,
and the task of deploying these shared parameters can be achieved using
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one of a number of simple methods, e.g. by publishing these parameters on
the IdP website. The proposed scheme has the advantage that it does not
require any additional key management.
6 Other possible solutions
We now consider three other possible ways in which the two highlighted
privacy issues might be addressed. We presented one possible approach in
section 4, and we now briefly describe and analyse some other possibilities.
Two of these approaches can be combined with the scheme described in
section 4, whereas the other is an alternative.
6.1 Using Symmetric Proof-keys
One possible way of addressing the reliance on a single layer of authentication
involves use of a long-term secret shared by the IdP and a user. Such a
secret could be exploited to provide a second layer of user authentication in a
variety of ways; in this section and in section 6.2 we consider two approaches
of this type. Both involve making use of the CardSpace proof-key.
The first approach requires a slight modification to the symmetric proof-
key service outlined in section 2.2. The IdP and the user must first establish
a long-term shared secret (k1), e.g. at the time of user registration with the
IdP. This secret could, for example, be generated by the IdP and stored
on the user machine or a portable user token (e.g. a USB memory stick or
smart card). In order to change this secret (or be re-issued with it), the user
would need to conduct a secure exchange with the RP.
In CardSpace, if the symmetric proof-key service is used, the IdP includes
an asymmetrically encrypted version of a short-term secret (k2) in the se-
curity token, using the RP’s public key. We propose that the IdP instead
includes an asymmetrically encrypted version of the value f = h(k1||k2),
where k2 is a short term secret, h is a cryptographic hash function, and ||
denotes concatenation of bit strings. The encryption uses the RP’s public
key, just as in the ‘standard’ scheme, and the IdP sends the short term secret
k2 to the user, again as in the standard scheme.
The CEUA can now re-compute the value f (using the user stored value
of k1 and the received value of k2) to prove its rightful possession of the
security token. Since this value is computed using the long-term secret k1,
this process adds an additional layer of authentication. That is, if the first
layer of authentication between the IdP and the user is broken (e.g. if the
password is compromised), the attacker will still need to know the long-term
secret in order to access the services offered by the RP. This scheme can
readily be integrated into CardSpace.
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6.2 Using Asymmetric Proof-keys
A second way of using a long-term secret shared by the user and an IdP
to provide a second layer of user authentication involves making a small
modification to the asymmetric proof-key service, outlined in section 2.2. We
present the scheme in the context of a discrete logarithm based asymmetric
cryptosystem, although variants for other types of asymmetric cryptosystem
may well be possible.
Suppose the user and IdP have agreed on the use of a finite cyclic groupG
of (large) order q, and a generator g of G, where finding discrete logarithms
for elements of G with respect to the base g is computationally infeasible.
Suppose also that the user and IdP share a secret integer k (where 0 < k <
q). Then, when requesting a token from the IdP, the user generates a random
integer x (where 0 < x < q), and sends gx to the IdP instead of sending its
public key, as would normally be the case for use of an asymmetric proof-
key. The user computes and retains (xk mod q) as its private proof-key.
The IdP then computes gxk(= (gx)k), and includes this in the token as the
asymmetric proof-key public key.
The remainder of the operation of the scheme is then identical to that for
the ‘standard’ asymmetric proof-key scheme. That is, the CEUA possesses
a private key corresponding to the public key in the token. The CEUA can
then use this private key to prove ownership of the token.
6.3 Modifying Claim Requests
Another way of addressing the problem of untrustworthy RPs avoids the
need for the RP to request sensitive information in the security token pro-
vided by the IdP. By doing so, the security token then becomes much less
privacy sensitive, and hence providing such a token to an untrustworthy RP
is no longer a major issue. That is, instead of seeking to avoid providing to-
kens to untrustworthy RPs, we attempt to minimise the privacy sensitivity
of tokens.
Such an approach requires the RP to know the user information in ad-
vance (as is the case for the solution discussed in section 4). We exploit this
knowledge by modifying the form of the request provided by the RP. That
is, instead of asking for user personal information, the RP asks for the IdP
to confirm that specific statements about the user’s personal information
are correct.
The IdP checks the information provided in the request and, if it is all
correct, the IdP responds with a token asserting this fact. Such a token is
clearly relatively non-sensitive.
Of course, this does mean that user information might be divulged to
someone impersonating a user, since the RP submits its request for a token
(which now contains potentially sensitive user information) before the user
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has been authenticated. It would appear difficult to address this issue with-
out modifying the framework — for example, if the RP knew which IdP was
to be used to provide the token, then it could encrypt its request so that
only the specified IdP could read it.
6.4 Combining Solutions
To conclude, we briefly consider how the various solutions we have proposed
might be combined. Firstly, it would seem clear that the solutions proposed
in 6.1 and 6.2 could readily be combined with the SIT-based solution pro-
posed in section 4. Indeed, if the third modification to the SIT-based scheme
proposed in section 5.1.4 was adopted, using one of the solutions in 6.1 and
6.2 would be particularly valuable, as otherwise there would be no second
layer of user authentication.
By contrast, the idea briefly discussed in 6.3, i.e. where the RP requests
confirmation of specified attributes instead of asking for the attribute values,
should be seen as an alternative to the SIT-based scheme in section 4, rather
than something that complements it. Of course, the scheme in section 6.3
could easily be combined with the schemes in section 6.1 and 6.2, since they
address completely different parts of the framework.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have provided an overview of, and outlined certain security
limitations in, the CardSpace identity metasystem. We focused on two such
limitations, namely its reliance on the user’s judgement on the trustworthi-
ness of the RP and a single layer of authentication.
We have proposed a modification to address these two security limita-
tions. The proposal involves applying Secured from Identity Theft (SIT)
attributes, based on Schnorr’s zero-knowledge protocol, to CardSpace. The
scheme may be vulnerable to guessing attacks; however, we have also pro-
posed a variety of measures to mitigate the risk of such attacks. Moreover,
we also described three possible means by which the CEUA might retrieve
the claim values.
The proposed solution can readily be integrated into the current CardSpace,
and only two (or three) steps need to be added to the framework. The pro-
posed solution requires some minor changes to the content of the security
token issued by the IdP, and the involved parties need only perform a small
number of inexpensive computations.
Finally, we discussed other possible ways of addressing the two identified
security limitations. Two of these approaches are based on the use of the
proof-key services offered by CardSpace.
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